Stephen Gilmore v. Neil Holland by unknown
2018 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-12-2018 
Stephen Gilmore v. Neil Holland 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018 
Recommended Citation 
"Stephen Gilmore v. Neil Holland" (2018). 2018 Decisions. 1055. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018/1055 
This December is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2018 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
No. 18-1503 
_____________ 
 
STEPHEN GILMORE; KAREN GILMORE, H/W,  
      Appellants 
 
v. 
 
NEIL R. HOLLAND, M.D.; RANDLE H. STORM, M.D.; GEISINGER MEDICAL 
CENTER; GEISINGER CLINIC D/B/A GEISINGER MEDICAL GROUP; JOHN 
DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; ABC CORPORATIONS 1-10, 
 
_____________ 
 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 4-17-cv-01781) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a): 
October 29, 2018  
 
Before:  CHAGARES, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: December 12, 2018) 
 
 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Stephen and Karen Gilmore filed an eleven-count complaint against Geisinger 
Medical Center (“GMC”), its related corporate entity, and Mr. Gilmore’s treating doctors 
Neil R. Holland, M.D. and Randle H. Storm, M.D. at GMC (collectively, “defendants”), 
seeking to recover for the extensive injuries — including paralysis — that Mr. Gilmore 
suffered after a medical procedure.  Only one count, brought under the Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”), raises a federal claim.  The 
defendants moved to dismiss the claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the basis 
that there is no plausible claim under EMTALA.  The United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania granted the motion, and the Gilmores appeal that 
decision.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm. 
I. 
Reviewing the District Court’s dismissal, we accept as true the factual allegations 
in the complaint.  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009).  We 
write solely for the parties and therefore recite only the facts necessary to our disposition.   
Mr. Gilmore had a scheduled, cardiac ablation procedure at GMC on October 7, 
2015.  Soon after that procedure, while he was still admitted as a patient, his medical 
condition worsened.  He complained of upper back pain, and his creatinine levels 
increased.  The following day, he was acutely hypertensive, and his legs felt weak and 
heavy.  By midday, his kidneys were failing.  His back pain worsened, his creatinine 
levels continued to rise, and he had been unable to urinate since the day prior.   
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By evening, Mr. Gilmore’s lower extremities were paralyzed.  Spinal surgery was 
conducted the following morning to relieve the spinal cord compression resulting from a 
hemorrhage.  On October 15, 2015, Mr. Gilmore was transferred to a rehabilitation 
center.  He has not returned home since.  Mr. Gilmore is paralyzed, suffers from severe 
neurological deficits, and requires extensive nursing home and rehabilitative care.   
The Gilmores allege ten tort-based causes of action and one federal cause of action 
arising under EMTALA.  The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), on grounds that the Gilmores did not state a plausible claim under 
EMTALA, and without EMTALA, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  The 
District Court granted the motion in its entirety.  The Gilmores timely appealed. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
dismissal for failure to state a claim.  Delaware Nation v. Pennsylvania, 446 F.3d 410, 
415 (3d Cir. 2006).  
III. 
EMTALA requires hospitals that receive federal funding to provide a “medical 
screening examination” for people who “come[ ] to the emergency department” 
regardless of insurance coverage or ability to pay.  42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a).  The statute 
further provides:   
If any individual . . . comes to a hospital and the hospital determines that 
the individual has an emergency medical condition, the hospital must 
provide either — (A) . . . for such further medical examination and such 
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treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical condition, or (B) for 
transfer of the individual to another medical facility in accordance with 
subsection (c).   
 
Id. at § 1395dd(b)(1).  Congress has expressly delegated authority to the Department of 
Health and Human Services’ Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) to 
construe Medicare-related statutes, like EMTALA, through rules and regulations.  See id. 
at § 1395hh; see also Torretti v. Main Line Hospitals, Inc., 580 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 
2009) (“CMS has the congressional authority to promulgate rules and regulations 
interpreting and implementing . . . EMTALA.”). 
CMS has promulgated a regulation providing that a hospital’s responsibilities 
under EMTALA end when an individual who came to the hospital for an emergency is 
then admitted “as an inpatient for further treatment.”  42 C.F.R. § 489.24(a)(1)(ii) (2013).  
The regulation further provides that the stabilization requirement does not apply “to an 
inpatient who was admitted for elective (nonemergency) diagnosis or treatment.”  Id. at § 
489.24(d)(2)(ii).   
We have held that this regulation is entitled to deference under Chevron USA, Inc. 
v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), because it is “consistent with 
EMTALA, and is in accord with the Act’s intent.”  Torretti, 580 F.3d at 177.  The 
purpose of EMTALA is “to curb the problem of patient dumping,” and therefore carving 
out an exception for individuals who have already been admitted as patients does not 
conflict with the Act’s goal.  Id. 
The regulation and our decision to defer to it answer the issue in this case.  The 
Gilmores allege that GMC’s responsibilities under EMTALA were triggered on October 
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8, 2015, when the emergency medical condition was identified.  That is, even though Mr. 
Gilmore had been admitted as an inpatient on October 7 for a nonemergency procedure, 
once his condition became emergent on October 8, GMC was obligated under EMTALA 
to stabilize him.1  But Mr. Gilmore did not “come[ ] to a hospital” with “an emergency 
medical condition.”  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1).  His condition became emergent the 
following day, after he was already receiving care as an inpatient.  Because hospitals are 
not required under EMTALA and its accompanying regulation to stabilize inpatients, the 
Gilmores cannot state a plausible claim for relief under EMTALA.   
We recognize that what Mr. Gilmore has suffered — like the harm alleged in most 
cases brought under EMTALA — is “tragic.”  Torretti, 580 F.3d at 170.  But EMTALA 
“is not a federal malpractice statute.”  Id.  If the defendants have acted negligently, he is 
not without recourse.  He retains the full arsenal of state law claims at his disposal, but he 
must now pursue those claims in state court.   
IV. 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the Order of the District Court. 
                                              
1 The Gilmores acknowledge that the CMS regulation forecloses this argument, but they 
contend the regulation “directly conflicts” with the statute.  Gilmore Br. 12.  This Court 
in Torretti has held otherwise, and a panel of this Court is not permitted to overrule a 
precedential opinion.  3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1 (2015).  Accordingly, Torretti binds this panel.    
 
